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Abstract
Background: Online risk calculators offer different levels of precision in their risk estimates. People interpret numbers in
varying ways depending on how they are presented, and we do not know how the number of decimal places displayed might
influence perceptions of risk estimates.
Objective: The objective of our study was to determine whether precision (ie, number of decimals) in risk estimates offered by
an online risk calculator influences users’ ratings of (1) how believable the estimate is, (2) risk magnitude (ie, how large or small
the risk feels to them), and (3) how well they can recall the risk estimate after a brief delay.
Methods: We developed two mock risk calculator websites that offered hypothetical percentage estimates of participants’
lifetime risk of kidney cancer. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition where the risk estimate value rose with increasing
precision (2, 2.1, 2.13, 2.133) or the risk estimate value fell with increasing precision (2, 1.9, 1.87, 1.867). Within each group,
participants were randomly assigned one of the four numbers as their first risk estimate, and later received one of the remaining
three as a comparison.
Results: Participants who completed the experiment (N = 3422) were a demographically diverse online sample, approximately
representative of the US adult population on age, gender, and race. Participants whose risk estimates had no decimal places gave
the highest ratings of believability (F3,3384 = 2.94, P = .03) and the lowest ratings of risk magnitude (F3,3384 = 4.70, P = .003).
Compared to estimates with decimal places, integer estimates were judged as highly believable by 7%–10% more participants
(χ23 =17.8, P < .001). When comparing two risk estimates with different levels of precision, large majorities of participants
reported that the numbers seemed equivalent across all measures. Both exact and approximate recall were highest for estimates
with zero decimals. Odds ratios (OR) for correct approximate recall (defined as being within 50% of the original estimate) were,
for one decimal place, OR = 0.65 (95% CI 0.49–0.86), for two decimal places, OR = 0.70 (95% CI 0.53–0.94), and for three
decimal places, 0.61 (95% CI 0.45–0.81). Exact recall showed a similar pattern, with larger effects.
http://www.jmir.org/2011/3/e54/
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Conclusions: There are subtle but measurable differences in how people interpret risk estimates of varying precision. Adding
decimal places in risk calculators offers little to no benefit and some cost. Rounding to the nearest integer is likely preferable for
communicating risk estimates via risk calculators so that they might be remembered correctly and judged as believable.
(J Med Internet Res 2011;13(3):e54) doi:10.2196/jmir.1656
KEYWORDS
Risk; risk assessment; communication; risk communication; perception; risk perception; calculators, programmable; risk calculator;
Internet; online

Introduction
Risk calculators abound online. Anyone with Internet access,
a Web browser, some interest in their future health, and five
minutes to spare can enter a few pieces of information about
themselves and receive an assessment of their risk of human
immunodeficiency virus infection [1], breast cancer [2], heart
attack [3,4], diabetes [5,6], prostate cancer recurrence [7,8], or
one of multiple options from a broad array of common
conditions [9]. Online risk calculators have been heralded as a
means to disseminate individualized risk prediction scores with
an aim toward increased understanding of personal risk,
improved health behavior, higher-quality decision making, and,
ultimately, better population health [10].
However, questions remain about how to best design risk
calculators to achieve the goals of risk communication. Different
calculators vary significantly in terms of their adherence to best
practices for risk communication [11], the amount of detail and
clinical specificity in their questionnaires, and the level of
precision that they offer in their risk assessments. For example,
a 55-year-old woman might use two different Web-based
calculators to check her risk of breast cancer in the next 10 years
and find that, according to one, her risk is 2.1% [12] while,
according to another, it is 5.05399% [13]. (See Multimedia
Appendix 1 for details.)
Robust underlying models may enable calculators to give precise
risk estimates. However, it is not known whether this additional
precision is helpful or harmful for people using risk calculators.
In other words, we can be more precise, but should we?
The importance of this question becomes apparent when one
considers the complex range of challenges inherent in risk
communication. Across levels of education and expertise, many
people, particularly those with poor numeracy, have trouble
interpreting numbers in health-risk communications [14,15]
and demonstrate biased interpretations of proportions [16]. For
example, people have been shown to rate a cancer as riskier
when it “kills 1286 out of 10,000 people” (about 13%) than
when it “kills 24.14 out of 100 people” (about 24%) [17], and
to prefer a lottery that offers 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 winning draws in
100 (5%–9%) over a lottery that offers 1 winning draw in 10
(10%) [18]. Furthermore, people respond differently to
proportions and numbers with decimals depending on the
presentation format—for example, percentages (25%), natural
frequencies (25 in 100), and “1 in n” formats (1 in 4) [19,20].
The precision of a number, in particular, can affect how people
perceive and act on numerical information. For example, home
buyers offer bids closer to the asking price for houses with more
http://www.jmir.org/2011/3/e54/
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precise list prices [21] and are more likely to choose a
battery-powered product with a battery life of 120–180 minutes
versus one with a battery life of 2–3 hours [22]. Consumers
[23,24] and investors [25] exhibit purchasing behavior
suggesting that many people may interpret prices with decimals
by simply truncating digits beyond the decimal point.
The effects of estimate precision in health have thus far been
studied by examining responses to point estimates (eg, 9%)
versus ranges of estimates (eg, 5%–13%). Previous qualitative
research suggested that ranges of risk estimates may be
perceived as more credible than point estimates [26]. Subsequent
experimental research showed that perceived risk was larger
for a range than a point estimate when the estimate was
expressed in text, but there was no main effect of precision on
credibility [27]. The sparse, mixed results in previous research
suggest that the effect of precision on believability of a risk
estimate remains an open question. Further, we propose that,
although ranges and number of significant figures are both used
mathematically to convey precision or lack thereof, they present
different questions when it comes to layperson responses.
Ranges make the imprecision explicit, whereas the number of
decimal places is an implicit signal. Many risk calculators give
a single point estimate [11], and, prior to this experiment, the
specific effects of the number of decimal places in a risk
estimate had not been studied.
In this study, we aimed to isolate the effects of precision—that
is, number of decimal places—on people’s interpretations of
risk estimates offered by online risk calculators. We selected
believability (“How believable is this number?”) and risk
magnitude (“How large or small does this number feel to you?”)
as primary outcomes. Perceptions of believability and risk
magnitude are critical to changing health attitudes and behavior
[28], common goals of risk calculators, and we suggest that
these are a reasonable first line of consideration when examining
responses to a risk estimate. People are unlikely to ponder
whether a risk is modifiable and what actions they might take
if they lack confidence in the estimate in the first place, and a
key measure for risk communication is the resulting subjective
feeling of how large or small the risk is.

Methods
Design of Experiment
Participants were asked to imagine they were visiting a kidney
cancer risk calculator. (See Multimedia Appendix 2 for full
methodological details, including exact wording used,
screenshots of the two mock risk calculators participants were
sent to, and rationale for design choices described here.) The
J Med Internet Res 2011 | vol. 13 | iss. 3 | e54 | p.2
(page number not for citation purposes)

JOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
calculator questions used actual risk factors for kidney cancer,
but randomly assigned each participant a risk estimate around
2%, slightly above the average lifetime risk statistic for US
adults of 1.49% [29]. Risk estimates were expressed as integers
with zero decimal places (2%), to one decimal place (1.9% or
2.1%), two decimal places (1.87% or 2.13%), or three decimal
places (1.867% or 2.133%). As shown by the numbers used,
numerical values either fell or rose slightly below or above 2%
with increasing decimals; participants were randomly assigned
to either the “falling” or “rising” group. Participants were also
randomly assigned to either a shorter version (fewer questions)
or longer version (more questions) of the mock risk calculator
to test whether a longer questionnaire might reasonably be seen
as providing a more credible estimate.
After completing the questions in the risk calculator, participants
were shown the “result” that they had been randomly assigned.
They were then asked to indicate the believability of the risk,
how large or small it felt to them, and a series of secondary
assessments about how well or poorly the following adjectives
described the estimate they were given: accurate, precise, exact,
likely to be wrong, scientific, and uncertain. These secondary
assessments were taken from previous work done by our
research group comparing point estimates and ranges [30], and
were intended to collect exploratory data that might help unpack
any differences found in primary outcomes.
To mimic a plausible response to receiving a risk
estimate—namely, seeking a second estimate to confirm or
contradict the first—participants were then directed to a second
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mock calculator that presented a second risk estimate. The
second estimate was randomly assigned from the other three
numbers in their rising or falling group of numbers. For
example, participants assigned to the falling group might receive
a first risk estimate of 1.9%, and their second risk estimate
would be randomly assigned as either 2%, 1.87%, or 1.867%.
Participants were then asked to compare the two numbers in
terms of believability, as well as the secondary outcomes of
accurate, precise, exact, likely to be wrong, scientific, and
uncertain. To remove the possibility that recall differences might
contaminate the comparisons, all comparison questions were
presented with the estimates as labels, with the first estimate as
the label for the first column, and the second estimate for the
second column. We did not ask participants to compare the
estimates in terms of risk magnitude because we predicted that
the difference in expressed values (for example, 2 > 1.9) would
dominate any effects of the level of precision and we therefore
saw little benefit in increasing respondent burden by adding
another comparison task.
Participants completed another survey about hypothetical
treatment choices for colon cancer, in which participants were
cross-randomized to avoid any systematic interaction between
the two surveys. They then completed a brief set of demographic
and individual difference measures. Finally, on the last page of
the combined survey, we asked participants to recall to the best
of their ability both risk estimates they had been given. (The
experimental procedure is detailed in Figure 1 and Multimedia
Appendix 3.)

Figure 1. Flow Diagram of Experiment.
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Recruitment
Email invitations were sent to a random sample of US adults
aged 30 to 70 years, selected from a panel of Internet users
administered by Survey Sampling International (Shelton, CT,
USA) and stratified by gender, age, and race to ensure
demographic diversity. The survey did not collect identifying
information. Survey Sampling International uses a complex
digital fingerprinting technique to ensure respondent uniqueness
[31]. The design was approved by the University of Michigan
Medical Institutional Review Board.

Measures
Independent Variables
Precision was operationalized by the number of decimals shown
in the risk estimate (ie, 0, 1, 2, or 3).
The direction of the risk estimate refers to whether the numeric
value of the estimates rose or fell with increasing precision. The
rising condition used the numbers 2, 2.1, 2.13, and 2.133. The
falling condition used 2, 1.9, 1.87, and 1.867.
The number of questions in the risk calculator was
operationalized as either 4 pages (screens) of questions in the
mocked-up questionnaire or the same 4 plus an additional 3
pages. The former, which contained 11 questions in all,
represents the condition fewer questions and the latter, which
contained 17 questions in all, represents the condition more
questions.

Primary Outcome Variables
Believability of the risk estimate was assessed by asking
participants to respond to the question, “Think about the risk
number you were given. In your opinion, how believable is this
number?” (emphasis original) on a 6-point Likert scale anchored
by “not at all” on one end and “extremely” on the other.
Responses were not labeled with their numeric value, meaning
that participants did not see any numbers, only a horizontal
visual array of equally spaced radio buttons. Believability was
collected immediately after viewing the risk estimate, on its
own survey page. For examining and reporting distribution of
responses, we defined the bottom two points of the scale as
representing low believability, the middle two points as
representing moderate believability, and the top two points as
representing high believability.
Perceived risk magnitude was a measure of how big the risk
estimate felt to participants. This outcome was assessed by the
question, “How large or small does the risk feel to you?”
(emphasis original). Responses were collected using a horizontal
slider labeled by “extremely small” on the left and “extremely
large” on the right. The slider marker was visible throughout
the interaction, with its default position in the center. We
anticipated that, while this might anchor results around the
center of the scale, such anchoring would not interfere with our
analysis, which aimed only to compare slider positions between
conditions. Therefore, the increased usability of making the
slider marker visible was worth the potential global bias. As
with the believability scale, participants saw only the visual
position of the slider, not the numeric values representing their
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response. Values were stored to 2 decimal places on the interval
[0, 1]. Risk magnitude was collected on its own survey page.

Secondary Outcome Variables
Secondary outcomes accurate, precise, exact, likely to be wrong,
scientific, and uncertain were assessed via the questions, “We
would also like to know, in your opinion: How accurate is this
number? How precise is this number? How exact is this
number? How scientific is this number? How likely is this
number to be wrong? How uncertain is this number?”
(emphases original). All were collected using 6-point Likert
scales anchored by “not at all” on one end and “extremely” on
the other, with no numeric feedback. These variables were
collected together on one survey page, in a randomly ordered
list.
To elicit comparisons between the two given risk estimates,
participants were first asked to compare the two numbers in
terms of believability, indicating whether the first estimate they
were given or the second was more believable, or if they were
equal in this respect. This comparison question was completed
on its own survey page, on which the response options were
labeled with the first risk estimate, then the second, then the
label “both equal.” On the next page, participants were given a
similar comparison task, this time applied to the same secondary
outcomes used earlier: accurate, precise, exact, likely to be
wrong, scientific, and uncertain, once again randomly ordered
in a list.
Measures of recall were elicited by asking participants, “To the
best of your ability, can you tell us the lifetime risk of kidney
cancer from the website calculators earlier in this survey? Please
enter the most detailed numbers you can remember.” We defined
correct exact recall as a recalled number that matched the given
risk estimate perfectly. We defined correct approximate recall
as a recalled estimate that was within 50% error of the given
number (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Equation for calculating participants’ approximate recall (within
50% error) of their estimated risk: recall represents the recalled number
and orig represents the original given estimate.

This definition enables a wide margin of error, which we deemed
appropriate for such a small risk estimate. Thus, recall estimates
between approximately 1% and 3% were defined as correct
approximate recall, whereas those outside the defined range
were defined as incorrect.

Individual Difference Measures
Individual difference measures used in this study were as
follows: subjective numeracy [32], cancer fear (using an adapted
breast cancer fear scale [33] that has been adapted as general
cancer fear in other research [34]), and three Big-5 personality
dimensions, neuroticism, openness, and agreeableness, which
were collected using a brief index of all five dimensions [35].
We also posed an ad hoc self-assessed measure of susceptibility
to marketing: “How much do you think your choices about the
J Med Internet Res 2011 | vol. 13 | iss. 3 | e54 | p.4
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things you buy are influenced by marketing?” assessed on a
6-point Likert scale anchored by “not at all influenced” and
“extremely influenced.” All of these measures were selected
for analysis due to their possible moderating effect on
individuals’ responses to different levels of precision.

Statistical Analyses
We analyzed ratings of believability and risk magnitude for the
first risk estimates via multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA). We used three independent variables: precision
(number of decimals), direction of values (rising versus falling),
and number of questions (4 screens versus 7). We included all
main effects and all 2-way interactions in the model and
conducted post hoc tests on precision (the only independent
variable with more than two levels) via the Tukey least
significant difference test. We performed a second MANOVA
with the same model to examine the effects of the independent
variables on the secondary outcomes accurate, precise, exact,
likely to be wrong, scientific, and uncertain.
To explore participants’ assessments of the comparisons between
the two risk estimates, observed differences in proportions for
each measure were tested via 2-tailed binomial tests. These tests
were conducted only on data from participants who judged the
two numbers as different on that measure.

http://www.jmir.org/2011/3/e54/
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Finally, we analyzed exact and approximate recall via repeated
measures logistic regression, regressing recall on the number
of decimals. We present both exact and approximate recall
results, though we focus on approximate recall as the fair and
practically relevant comparison. Recalling a value expressed to
more decimal places exactly requires additional memory
capacity, and it is unlikely that people would need to recall
estimates to a high level of precision for any practical purpose.
Data were entered and analyzed in SPSS version 16.0 (IBM
Corporation, Somers, NY, USA).

Results
Recruitment
Out of 4242 people who clicked the link to launch the survey,
4117 (97%) continued beyond the informed consent page, and
3422 (81%) completed the survey. All completed surveys were
analyzed. Completion rates were consistent across experimental
conditions. Characteristics of study participants are shown in
Table 1. Participants’ ages ranged from 30 to 70 years old with
mean age 50 (SD 11) years, 1723/3305 (52%) were female,
participants were racially and ethnically diverse, and 1483/3402
participants (44%) had an associate’s degree or higher.
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Table 1. Study participant characteristics (N = 3422)
Characteristic
Age (years), mean (SD)

50 (11)

Gender, n (%)
Female

1723 (52%)

Male

1582 (48%)

Ethnicity, n (%)
Hispanic

486 (14%)

Middle Eastern

46 (1%)

Race, n (%)
White or Caucasian

2518 (74%)

Black or African American

529 (16%)

American Indian or Alaska Native

55 (2%)

Asian or Asian American

150 (4%)

Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian

17 (0.5%)

Other

167 (5%)

Highest education level reached, n (%)

a

None

2 (0.1%)

Elementary school

4 (0.1%)

Some high school, but no diploma

72 (2%)

High school (diploma or GEDa)

665 (19%)

Trade school

186 (6%)

Some college, but no degree

990 (29%)

Associate’s degree (AA, AS, etc)

357 (11%)

Bachelor’s degree (BS, BA, etc)

759 (22%)

Master’s degree (MA, MPH, etc)

306 (9%)

Doctoral/professional degree (PhD, MD, etc)

61 (2%)

General equivalency diploma.

Statistical Analyses
The precision of the risk estimate was related to believability
and perceived risk magnitude. In particular, risk estimates with
zero decimals yielded the highest believability scores, with
scores decreasing slightly with increasing number of decimal
places (F3,3384 = 2.94, P = .03, partial eta squared = .003).
Believability was not significantly related to the number of
questions in the risk calculator. Participants whose estimates
had more decimals felt that the risk magnitude was larger (F3,3384
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= 4.70, P = .003, partial eta squared = .004), as did participants
who were assigned to a risk calculator with fewer questions
(F3,3384 = 5.85, P = .02, partial eta squared = .002). For both
believability and risk magnitude, direction of values did not
have a significant effect, and there were no significant
interactions. See Table 2 for further details.
The distribution of believability ratings is shown in Table 3.
Risk estimates with zero decimals yielded 7%–10% more
participants who rated the estimate as highly believable (χ23 =
17.8, P < .001).
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Table 2. Primary outcomes
Believability: 1 = not at all,
6 = extremely; mean (SD)

a

Risk magnitude: 0 = extremely small,
1 = extremely large; mean (SD)a

Precision (number of decimal places)
0

4.35 (1.24) (reference)

.21 (.24) (reference)

1

4.24 (1.23) (P = .07)

.24 (.24) (P = .03)

2

4.21 (1.26) (P = .02)

.23 (.24) (P = .20)

3

4.19 (1.22) (P = .006)

.26 (.25) (P < .001)

Overall significance

P = .03

P = .003

Direction of values (rising: 2, 2.1, 2.13, 2.133 ; falling: 2, 1.9, 1.87, 1.867)
Rising

4.24 (1.24)

.24 (.24)

Falling

4.26 (1.24)

.23 (.24)

Overall significance

P = .59

P = .18

Number of questions (fewer: 4 screens of questions ; more: 7 screens of questions)

a

Fewer

4.21 (1.22)

.25 (.25)

More

4.28 (1.26)

.22 (.24)

Overall significance

P = .10

P = .02

P values reported next to means for precision refer to Tukey least significant difference referenced against zero decimals.

Table 3. Distribution (n, %) of believability responses by precision (also see Table 4.1 in Multimedia Appendix 4)
Low believability

Moderate believability

High believability

Precision (number of decimal places)
0

63 (7%)

353 (41%)

450 (52%)

1

60 (8%)

378 (47%)

362 (45%)

2

80 (9%)

389 (46%)

383 (45%)

3

69 (8%)

440 (50%)

373 (42%)

Estimates with one decimal point were rated as the least
uncertain compared to estimates with zero (P = .02), two (P =
.001), or three (P = .001) decimal places (F3,3314 = 4.76, P =
.003, partial eta squared = .004.) However, none of the related
terms accurate, precise, exact, likely to be wrong, or scientific
showed a significant difference between different numbers of
decimals, which may suggest possible confusion about the
meaning(s) of uncertainty, which has multiple meanings, each
of which ought to line up conceptually with at least one of the
other terms. If participants interpreted uncertainty as an
assessment of the truth of the estimate, we would also expect
differences in ratings of accuracy and likelihood of being wrong.
If, on the other hand, uncertainty were to be interpreted as an
assessment of precision, we would expect ratings of precision
and exactitude to show differences. None of these differences
were in evidence and, thus, the secondary measures did not
suggest potential mechanisms to explain this finding.
Ratings of accuracy were higher in the condition with more
questions (F1,3314 = 4.16, P = .04, partial eta squared = .001),
but number of questions did not have a significant effect on any
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other terms. Direction of values did not have a significant effect,
and there were no significant interactions.
Overall, none of the secondary measures suggested potential
mechanisms to explain the primary findings.
Individual difference measures demonstrated strong main effects
in the expected directions. (See Multimedia Appendix 4 for
details.) However, none of the individual difference measures
showed any statistically significant interactions with precision,
suggesting that the effects of precision are consistent across
types of users.
When comparing the first and second risk estimates they were
given, large majorities of participants indicated equality across
all measures (see Table 4 for a summary; see Multimedia
Appendix 4 for tables detailing comparisons across combinations
of number of decimals.) The minority of participants who
thought the two numbers were different on one or more
measures judged estimates with fewer decimals as more
believable, but also less accurate, less precise, less exact, less
scientific, and more uncertain.
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Table 4. Comparisons of two risk estimates
Percentage of participants who chose
Which number is more

Number with

Both numbers

Number with

Significance of observed proportion of

fewer decimals

equal

more decimals

participants choosing fewer vs more decimals

Believablea?

11%

80%

9%

P = .006

Accurateb?

13%

70%

17%

P < .001

Preciseb?

13%

62%

25%

P < .001

Exactb?

13%

63%

24%

P < .001

Scientificb?

11%

69%

20%

P < .001

Likely to be wrongb?

13%

74%

14%

P = .28

Uncertainb?

15%

72%

13%

P = .002

a

Primary comparison outcome, question presented first on its own survey page.

b

Secondary comparison outcomes, questions presented together on one page in random order.

After completing the questions comparing the two risk estimates,
participants spent a median of 9.6 minutes (interquartile range
6.5 minutes) answering an unrelated survey before reaching the
recall task, in which they were asked to recall both risk estimates
they had been given earlier. Participants were not warned that
they would be asked to recall the numbers.

The proportions of participants with correct recall are shown in
Table 5 for both exact and approximate recall error. Errors in
exact recall increased quickly with precision. The majority of
participants had correct approximate recall across all levels of
precision, but errors remained more common in estimates with
decimal places than in those with zero decimals. The effects of
precision were significant on both exact and approximate recall.

Table 5. Participants with correct recall
Exact recall
Precision

Approximate recall

Correct

Odds ratio (95% CI)

Correct

Odds ratio (95% CI)

0

93%

Reference

96%

Reference

1

83%

0.36 (0.29–0.44)

94%

0.65 (0.49–0.86)

2

70%

0.17 (0.14–0.21)

95%

0.70 (0.53–0.94)

3

43%

0.06 (0.05–0.07)

94%

0.61 (0.45–0.81)

(number of decimals)

Wald χ23 = 1014, P < .001

Discussion
Principal Results
This study suggests that risk calculators that produce risk
estimates with different levels of precision can result in different
perceptions of those estimates in terms of believability and risk
magnitude, as well as differences in recall. In this experiment,
risk estimates with zero decimals were judged as the most
believable. People may find integers somewhat more believable
than numbers with decimals simply because integers are easier
to understand. As evidenced by, for example, jokes and
confusion about an average American family having 2.2
children, it is challenging for people to map population-based
statistics onto individual circumstances. Indeed, many people,
even those who are well educated, have trouble with
probabilities and percentages [36,37]. This is particularly true
of people with poor numeracy skills [38]. The fact that people
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have trouble with this concept is perhaps not surprising given
that a patient doesn’t experience the probability of an event
occurring; she or he either experiences the event or not [39].
Therefore, truly understanding a risk estimate requires
conceptually mapping a probability onto a binary outcome.
Adding decimals to the risk estimate only makes this task more
challenging. Simplifying the risk estimate might therefore
increase understanding and, hence, believability.
Risk estimates with the least precision (zero decimals) also felt
smaller on average than estimates with greater precision. This
finding parallels previous research on ratio bias, in which
statistical frequencies presented using smaller denominators
felt smaller than those that used larger denominators [15,16].
We speculate that seeing fewer numbers evokes in people a
smaller degree of number sense and hence lower risk
magnitudes.
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Lower precision was also associated with better recall of the
given risk estimates. It is not particularly surprising that people
found numbers with more decimals places more difficult to
remember perfectly. Recalling four digits takes considerably
more cognitive capacity than recalling one. It is more notable
that, even when allowing for a very generous margin of error
in a recall task that took place shortly after the estimate was
provided, there were statistically significant differences in
approximate recall between estimates with zero decimals and
all three estimates with decimals. This means that using decimals
in a risk estimate not only reduces the chances that users will
be able to recall the number exactly, but also reduces the
likelihood that they will be able to remember it even
approximately. This may be partially attributable to a lack of
understanding about the meaning of decimals, because if people
are unable to comprehend the data that they have been given,
they will not be able to turn it into information that can later be
recalled.
This study also suggests that the number of questions asked in
a risk calculator may have an effect on perceived risk magnitude.
People who completed a longer questionnaire judged the risk
estimate as smaller. Although our study found no statistical
effect of the number of questions in the calculator on
believability, this may have been because even our version with
fewer pages of questions was sufficient to be over a threshold
of believability. Further research will be required to explore the
effects of very brief questionnaires on people’s assessments of
risk calculators, but it is worth noting that, even with a very
detailed questionnaire, the estimate with zero decimals still
garnered the highest believability scores.

Limitations
There are three main limitations to this study. First, this
experiment was based on a hypothetical scenario with artificial
risk estimates all around 2%. We do not know whether similar
effects would be found in situations in which numbers are real
and individualized for the user, people are self-motivated to
seek out the risk information, and/or numbers are larger or
smaller. However, our mock risk calculator was modeled after
real-world examples, and thus we have no reason to believe that
patient behavior would differ when using an actual risk
calculator to which he or she was directed, for example, in a
routine monthly email from his or her health care group or
system. We acknowledge that it is more difficult to predict how
people might respond in a similar situation in which they are
deliberately seeking out the information. However, conducting
a controlled experiment in which the only variation was random
assignment of the number of decimals in the risk estimate
allowed us to control for many of the complexities of how
people decide whether a piece of online health information is
trustworthy, thereby isolating the unique effects of the precision
of the risk estimate. Findings regarding real-world use of risk
calculators will depend to some extent on users’ prior
expectations regarding their risk; for example, people may be
resistant to accepting risk estimates that are higher than their
prior expectations [40]. We did not assess prior expectations in
this study because we wished to avoid biasing responses to our
questionnaire [41], so we cannot speculate on how relationships
between prior expectations and assigned estimates might have
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influenced participants’ responses. We believe our findings will
remain applicable to real-world risk calculators that display
risks of varying magnitudes, but confirming this belief requires
further research.
Second, all of the statistically significant findings in this study
have small effect sizes. Single-digit F statistics, small odds
ratios, and modest findings in post hoc tests suggest only small
differences in the way people interpret and recall risk estimates
with varying levels of decimal precision. However, online risk
calculators aim to reach large numbers of people amid a
cacophony of conflicting and confusing health information.
Therefore, as with other challenges in the complex field of health
communication, small effects may be worth attention, especially
when they can be brought about by design modifications as
easily implemented as rounding risk estimates to the nearest
integer. If developers of a risk calculator would like users to
judge received estimates as highly believable, this research
suggests that expressing results as integers may help with this
goal. The simplicity of this design change implies a high
benefit-cost ratio.
Third, although our study included some secondary outcomes
selected in the hopes that these might help unpack any
differences found in the primary outcomes, effects on the
secondary measures were largely absent. This may be partly
attributable to the small effect sizes on the primary outcomes—it
can be harder to unpack a small box. Nonetheless, it would be
useful to better understand the mechanisms behind any
differences in how people perceive risk estimates expressed as
integers versus those with decimal places. Further research will
be required to achieve this understanding.

Comparison With Prior Work
To our knowledge, there has been no prior work examining the
effect of decimal precision in risk estimates.
However, our finding that increased precision leads to lower
believability is in line with previous qualitative research
suggesting that ranges of risk estimates may be seen as more
credible than point estimates [26]. On the other hand, our finding
is in contrast with experimental work that followed this
qualitative study, which found no main effect on credibility
[27]. This lack of agreement may be due to the inherent
difference between the way people interpret ranges versus point
estimates and the way they interpret numbers of decimal places.
It may also be due to measurement differences. In the previous
study, credibility was defined by an ad hoc scale that combined
two items—ratings of trust in the results of the computer
program and perceptions of accuracy of the risk
estimate—whereas in our study, we assessed believability by
asking participants to rate the believability of the estimate
directly.
Our finding that increased precision also leads to perception of
lower risk magnitude is in contrast with previous research in
which more ambiguous risk estimates, meaning those expressed
as ranges rather than point estimates, led to increased risk
perceptions [26,27]. We believe that this difference is another
example of differences in interpretation between different ways
of expressing precision—that is, decimals places, or ranges and
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point estimates. Both findings (those in previous work and ours)
support our speculation that seeing fewer numbers may elicit a
lower overall sense of magnitude.
Research in consumer pricing suggests that prices with decimal
places may be interpreted by simply ignoring numbers after the
decimal place. If this were to also occur in health risks, we
would expect to observe an interaction between precision and
direction on perceived risk magnitude. That is, we would expect
risk magnitude scores for the rising condition (2, 2.1, 2.13, and
2.133) to remain consistent regardless of precision, while those
for the falling condition (2, 1.9, 1.87, and 1.867) would decrease
between the first estimate and the other 3. We did not observe
any such interaction, and we suggest that this is likely because,
even if this effect exists in the health context, it may be
significantly smaller and thus not detectable in this study. In
other words, a price of $1 may feel different from $2, but a 1%
risk may not feel meaningfully smaller than a 2% risk.

Witteman et al
Our finding that fewer decimal places leads to better recall is
consistent with research reporting that health communications
that provide less detail lead to higher comprehension than those
that provide more detail [42,43].

Conclusions
There are subtle but significant differences in how people
interpret risk estimates of varying precision. Increasing precision
in the form of decimal places shows no clear benefit and
suggests small but significant costs. Results from our experiment
suggest that, in general, rounding to the nearest integer is
preferable for communicating small risk estimates so that they
may be judged as believable and remembered correctly. Given
these findings, we recommend that risk calculator designers
structure their algorithms to express risk in integers, though
expressions to 1 decimal place may also be acceptable in
situations when user recall of the number is not an important
consideration or when greater precision is necessary to show
differences between two or more numbers.
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